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 TORT REFORM AND THE ROLE OF
 GOVERNMENT IN PRIVATE INSURANCE
 MARKETS
 PATRICIA M. DANZON*
 PUBLIC concern over liability rules in recent years has been triggered by
 disruption in liability insurance markets. The medical malpractice and
 product liability "crises" of the mid-seventies were marked by insurance
 premium increases of several hundred percent in a single year and com-
 plete withdrawal of commercial carriers from some areas. Although insur-
 ance is now generally available, high premium rates for some product
 lines remain controversial.' A related and growing concern is the inade-
 quacy of existing insurance and self-insurance reserves to cover prod-
 uct liability claims for occupational disease.
 These disruptions have led to two types of statutory response. The first,
 which works on the tort system directly, includes changes in underlying
 liability rules, redefining damages, the standard of care, and the statute of
 limitations. The second operates on insurance markets, through rate regu-
 lation and various subsidy mechanisms. This paper evaluates these two
 forms of intervention, noting that the tort system may be viewed as a
 system of compulsory insurance,2 with terms of coverage determined
 largely by the private choices that generate court decisions. Statutory tort
 reform may be viewed as a collective choice to override the private
 choices reflected in the evolution of common law.
 * Associate Professor, Center for Health Policy Research and Education, Duke Univer-
 sity. This paper was written while I was Senior Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution. I
 would like to acknowledge the helpful comments of Robert Ellickson, Roger Noll, Mitchell
 Polinsky, Gary Schwartz, and other participants in the Stanford Law and Economics Free
 Lunch program, and Daniel Rubinfeld.
 ' Hearings on the Nature and Causes of the Product Liability Problem Before the Sub-
 comm. on Consumer Protection and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
 Commerce, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979).
 2 See, for example, Walter Y. Oi, The Economics of Product Safety, 4 Bell J. Econ. 3
 (1973).
 [Journal of Legal Studies, vol. XIII (August 1984)]
 @ 1984 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0047-2530/84/1303-0001$01.50
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 I adopt the premise that the criterion for an efficient liability rule is the
 minimization of costs from four sources: injuries, injury prevention, risk
 bearing, and the overhead cost of litigation and administration. In the case
 of medical malpractice and product-related injuries, some transfer of lia-
 bility from victim to injurer seems optimal, because of information asym-
 metries and contracting costs. Imposing liability on injurers promises
 gains in prevention, and perhaps risk allocation, that outweigh the addi-
 tional overhead costs. But it remains to define the limits of the optimal
 transfer of liability on several margins. Here I ignore the fundamental
 question whether the liability rule should be negligence or strict liability
 and focus instead on the amount of compensation and the period in which
 claims may be brought.
 Any rule of third-party liability provides the potential beneficiary with
 some degree of compulsory insurance and, like any insurance, thereby
 invites moral hazard on several dimensions. Here I ignore the question of
 reduced incentives for injury prevention by the potential victim. My con-
 cern is with incentives to file exaggerated or invalid claims. I argue that,
 whether because of this moral hazard or other biases, liability on both
 margins-size of awards and period for suit-has been pushed beyond
 the socially optimal level, given the resulting impact on deterrence, risk
 allocation, and overhead costs. Statutory limitations on damage awards
 and on the period for suit (statutes of limitations or repose) would im-
 prove the overall efficiency of the tort system in ways that have been
 neglected by courts ruling on the constitutionality of such legislation.3
 These limits would also go a long way toward resolving the perceived
 problems in liability insurance markets and are superior to the alternative
 of direct government intervention.
 The paper is in two parts. Part I discusses awards. Section IA describes
 the theoretically optimal structure of awards for the dual purpose of com-
 pensation and deterrence. The formal model in Appendix A, following
 Spence,4 shows the optimality of a two-part rule of damages: (1) a com-
 pensatory award, paid to the victim, determined by the amount of insur-
 ance he would have chosen to buy given the price of the defendant's
 liability insurance; and (2) a "deterrence surcharge" or fine on the defen-
 dant, paid to the state, determined by potential victims' willingness to pay
 for injury prevention and by the uninsured costs of suit to the defendant.
 Empirical evidence is then presented to provide rough dollar counterparts
 to these theoretical constructs. The tort norm of full compensation is
 3 For example, 25 A.L.R. 4th 643 (1983).
 4 A. Michael Spence, Consumer Misperceptions, Product Failure and Producer Liability,
 44 Rev. Econ. Stud. 561 (1977).
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 shown to provide more insurance than people would voluntarily choose.
 While this conclusion and several parts of the underlying analysis are not
 new, my purpose is to pull them together and draw explicit inferences for
 tort reform. Sections IE and IF analyze two specific proposals. The first
 replaces the existing system of individually determined awards with a
 schedule of payments, similar in principle but not necessarily in mag-
 nitude to workers' compensation benefit schedules. The second integrates
 tort with other private and public sources of coverage, by providing for
 subrogation rights of all private coverages against the tort award and
 reduction of public benefits by the amount of tort recovery.
 Part II analyzes the impact of long statutes of repose for latent injuries
 and long-lived products, when liability rules are changing and uncertain.5
 Anticipated changes may either force an intergenerational transfer or ex-
 pose producers or victims to risk. Uncertain changes create sociolegal
 risk that is independent of the size of the risk pool and cannot be cost-
 lessly diversified through multiline insurance portfolios or stock markets.
 A model of the relationship between the statute of limitations, the insur-
 ance risk, and the price of insurance is developed (Appendix B). The
 concluding subsection argues for a shorter statute of repose, shifting com-
 pensation for long latent injuries to first-party mechanisms, in preference
 to special government funds.
 I. SIZE OF AWARDS
 Awards for catastrophic injuries account for a very large fraction of the
 cost of the tort system. Three percent of all medical malpractice claims
 (or 5 percent of paid claims) account for 50 percent of the total dollars
 paid out. Since the early seventies, tort awards, especially for severe
 injuries, have grown more rapidly than the rate of inflation.6 In response
 5 Several different definitions of "statute of repose" are in use. See Francis E.
 McGovern, The Variety, Policy and Constitutionality of Product Liability Statutes of Re-
 pose, 30 Am. U. L. Rev. 579 (1981). I use "statute of repose" to refer to a statute that places
 a limit on the time in which actions may be brought under traditional statutes of limitations.
 This may be done either by setting an outer limit on a "discovery" provision or by setting
 the time at which the statute begins to run at a different point from traditional tort statutes of
 limitation, which begin to run only when the cause of action, including the manifestation of
 the injury, has accrued.
 6 For the period 1971-78 the Insurance Services Office estimates annual growth rates in
 average incurred cost per claim as follows: physicians and surgeons, 12.1 percent; hospitals,
 18.9 percent; product liability bodily injury, 19.4 percent; automobile bodily injury, 14.1
 percent. Patricia M. Danzon, The Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims,
 27 J. Law & Econ. 115 (1984). See also Mark A. Peterson & George L. Priest, The Civil
 Jury: Trends in Trials and Verdicts, Cook County, Illinois, 1960-1979 (R-2881-ICJ, Rand
 Corp. 1982).
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 to the liability crisis of the mid-seventies, many states enacted tort "re-
 forms" designed to reduce awards. Of these changes, dollar caps and
 mandatory offset of compensation from collateral sources appear to have
 had a significant impact,' but in several states they have not survived
 constitutional challenge.
 A. The Optimal Structure of Tort Awards
 Under current rules, tort damage awards may have both a compensa-
 tory and a punitive component. Compensatory awards are intended to
 compensate fully for pecuniary and nonpecuniary losses. In addition to
 compensatory damages, punitive damages may be awarded in cases of
 reckless disregard.
 Cook and Graham and Spence have shown that the principle of full
 compensation is unlikely to be optimal from the standpoint of either deter-
 rence or compensation, at least in the case of seriously disabling injuries.8
 In Appendix A, I develop a model of the optimal structure of awards
 when the potential injurer (producer) and victim (consumer) are in a mar-
 ket relationship and the probability of injury depends only on the preven-
 tion effort of the producer.9 The model extends that of Spence, by allow-
 ing for uninsured costs of suit to the injurer, and by recognizing the
 expense loading in liability insurance premiums. The effect of consumer
 misperception of risk is analyzed, since this provides the primary
 rationale for restrictions on private contracts and mandatory third-party
 liability in these markets.
 The main implications of this model are that the optimal award depends
 on the type of injury, the expense load of the defendant's liability insur-
 ance, and the extent to which contractual relations between the parties
 transmit ex ante consumers' true willingness to pay for safety. There are
 two issues: compensation and deterrence. Optimal compensation de-
 pends only on the type of loss and the expense loading. The optimal
 compensatory award is the amount of insurance the victim would have
 purchased voluntarily, at the price implied by the load of the defendant's
 liability insurance.'l This is intuitively obvious, since the tort system
 provides compulsory insurance, purchased from the defendant or ulti-
 mately from his liability insurer. The tort norm of full compensation is
 7 Danzon, supra note 6.
 8 Philip J. Cook & Daniel A. Graham, The Demand for Insurance and Protection: The
 Case of Irreplaceable Commodities, 91 Q. J. Econ. 143 (1977). Spence, supra note 4.
 9 The model can readily be extended to include victim precautions. See Samuel A. Rea,
 Jr., Nonpecuniary Loss and Breach of Contract, 11 J. Legal Stud. 35 (1982).
 1o This analysis ignores social benefits from private enforcement of laws.
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 optimal only if the loss is purely monetary and the load is zero. But for a
 serious injury that affects the utility of wealth, optimal compensation
 could be more or less than the monetary loss, depending on whether
 disability raises or lowers the marginal utility of wealth, which cannot be
 determined a priori." Full compensation for pain and suffering is unlikely
 to be optimal, because insurance can only transfer money from the
 healthy to the disabled state, but money cannot replace the nonpecuniary
 losses of physical injury. Optimal insurance transfers dollars only to the
 point where the victim values the marginal dollar as much when disabled
 as when he is healthy. With a positive load, optimal coverage is lower.
 If optimal compensation is less than full, so the victim is not indifferent
 to the occurrence of injury, the compensatory award alone may provide
 insufficient incentives for prevention. If consumers are in a market rela-
 tion with producers, and correctly perceive the risk of injury ex ante and
 can costlessly monitor contract performance ex post, consumer willing-
 ness to pay for injury prevention is internalized to producers through
 markets. In that case, the compensatory award also suffices for optimal
 deterrence.
 But if consumers misperceive risk or cannot observe whether the qual-
 ity of service delivered is that contracted for-or if contracting costs are
 high-consumer willingness to pay for risk reduction is not internalized to
 the injurer. The tort system may correct this potential market failure by
 levying a fine over and above the compensatory award. At the extreme,
 with no internalization through markets and a risk-neutral or fully insured
 (but perfectly experience rated) defendant, the optimal fine is the value of
 the injury implied by the victim's willingness to pay for prevention given
 optimal insurance. The optimal fine is less if (a) markets transmit some-
 what, albeit imperfectly, the value consumers place on prevention, or (b)
 the defendant incurs uninsurable costs of suit, such as loss of time or
 reputation.12 In principle, the fine should be paid to the state and refunded
 as a subsidy to consumers of the risky product. If the fine is paid as
 compensation to individual victims, it provides more insurance than con-
 sumers would buy voluntarily, and hence product prices, which will in-
 clude the cost of this insurance, would be too high. This distortion of
 relative prices is avoided if the fine is refunded as a subsidy.
 " See also Daniel A. Graham & Ellen R. Peirce, Contingent Damages for Products
 Liability, in this issue.
 12 The fine necessary to induce compliance with a negligence standard is less than the
 optimal fine under strict liability, assuming the due care standard is known and enforced
 without error, because the defendant's cost function is discontinuous under a negligence
 rule. See note 71 infra.
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 Although the current system of compensatory plus punitive damage
 awards is structurally similar to this ideal two-part system, it is defective
 in that (1) compensatory awards aim at full compensation for pecuniary
 plus nonpecuniary loss, regardless of consumers' willingness to pay for
 such insurance, and (2) punitive awards are judged by defendants' con-
 duct rather than consumers' willingness to pay for prevention, and are
 paid as compensation to victims rather than refunded to consumers. The
 full compensation principle implies excessive deterrence and excessive
 insurance.13
 The implementation of this theoretically optimal structure of awards
 requires information on willingness to pay for insurance and prevention
 that cannot be determined a priori. For this we must turn to empirical
 evidence.
 B. Evidence on the Demand for Disability Insurance
 Theory cannot tell us whether disability lowers or raises the utility of
 wealth, so cannot tell us whether optimal compensation is less or greater
 than monetary loss. On this question there are two sources of empirical
 evidence. Compulsory public coverages-Social Security Disability In-
 come (SSDI), workers' compensation, Medicare and Medicaid-indicate
 collective choices, given implicit prices which reflect moral hazard and
 the redistributive features of the funding system. Because participation is
 compulsory, adverse selection is not an issue. Private first-party coverage
 indicates what people are prepared to pay for, given the mandatory public
 programs and tort, at prices that reflect risks of adverse selection and
 moral hazard in private insurance markets.
 1. Wage Loss. Under SSDI, the primary public disability program,
 income replacement varies with the age, work experience, family size,
 and predisability earnings of the recipient. Replacement rates for persons
 eligible for family benefits range from less than 40 percent for those with
 predisability earnings greater than the taxable maximum ($1,475 per
 month in 1978) to 86 percent for those earning the minimum wage ($442
 per month in 1978). For individuals, comparable replacement levels range
 3 Compensation for pain and suffering, if correctly calculated as willingness to pay for
 prevention, would provide optimal deterrence but excessive compensation. Willingness to
 pay as a measure of compensation for pain and suffering is discussed in Bryan C. Conley &
 G. M. Flick, Toward an Objective Valuation of Pain and Suffering (January 1978) (unpub-
 lished manuscript, Grad. School Business Administration, Univ. Southern California). They
 do not distinguish between the optimum award for purposes of compensation and deter-
 rence.
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 from less than 30 percent to 55 percent. Since these ratios are calculated
 relative to pretax earnings, replacement of after-tax income is higher.14
 In 1980, only 21 million people, or 10 percent of the population under
 sixty-four (19.7 percent of the labor force) had private long-term disability
 (LTD) income protection. However, 45 percent of civilian workers have
 private pension coverage which often pays in the event of early disability.
 Coverage under private LTD and pension plans is less than full income
 replacement. All private LTD plans limit replacement levels to 60-70
 percent of predisability salary and include offset provisions against other
 coverages, in particular SSDI, to prevent benefits exceeding this limit.15
 For example, for steel workers, whose fringe benefits are more generous
 than average, replacement income without SSDI benefits averages 0-48
 percent of predisability wages, 55-70 percent with SSDI benefits.16 The
 apparent gaps in private wage-loss coverage, despite the tax advantages
 of employment-based plans,17 appear to reflect the fact that for the major-
 ity of workers, SSDI benefits already provide the maximum permitted by
 private insurers, namely 60-70 percent of predisability, pretax earnings,
 with offset of SSDI benefits.'8
 2. Medical Expense. Private insurance markets indicate a lack of will-
 ingness to pay for unlimited medical care. Forty-eight percent of the
 population under sixty-five has no private major medical expense protec-
 tion and private coverage of nursing home or noninstitutional long-term
 care is negligible. 19 Only 36 percent of major medical plans have unlimited
 maximum benefits.20 The prevalence of major medical policies overstates
 private coverage of long-term medical expense because 76 percent is
 14 Charles W. Meyer, Social Security Disability Insurance (1979).
 5 Health Insurance Association of America, New Group Health Insurance Policies
 (1983).
 16 Lawrence S. Roof, Fringe Benefits: Social Insurance in the Steel Industry 115 (1982).
 17 Insurance premiums and employer contributions to pension funds are a business ex-
 pense, and interest on such funds is substantially exempt from tax.
 18 Since eligibility for SSDI benefits is not conditioned on other nonearned income, the
 tendency for a means-tested public insurance program to undermine the demand for private
 insurance does not apply. Samuel A. Rea, Jr., Private Disability Insurance and Public
 Welfare Programs, 36 J. Pub. Finance 84 (1981). But a related effect may operate. Private
 coverage for catastrophic health expense and long-term care is limited (see infra). To be
 eligible for public support for such expenses, the individual must "spend down" to the
 Medicaid income threshold. Thus the optimum private strategy for long-term institutional
 care may be to rely on Medicaid, in which case private wage-loss insurance has little value.
 19 Fewer than 4 percent of nursing home expenditures are covered by private insurance.
 Congressional Budget Office, Long-Term Care for the Elderly and Disabled (1977).
 20 Health Insurance Association of America, Source Book of Health Insurance, 1981-82
 (1983).
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 employment based, so is lost if the disabled person loses his job.21 But as
 in the case of wage loss, apparent gaps in private medical coverage may
 reflect a rational adjustment to public programs. After two years the SSDI
 recipient is eligible for Medicare, which covers acute care. Long-term
 institutional care is covered by Medicaid, which pays for over one-third of
 all long-term-care recipients.
 3. Lump-Sum Payments. The only private disability insurance which
 is not a replacement of specific expenses and thus bears some resem-
 blance to compensation for pain and suffering is accidental death and
 dismembership (ADD) insurance, carried by 57 percent of civilian wage
 earners.22 These policies typically pay a prespecified sum in the event of a
 readily identifiable physical injury, such as loss of a limb. But the fact that
 total ADD contributions by employers and employees are less than 1
 percent of total contributions to health benefits is indicative of a relatively
 low willingness to pay for compensation beyond income replacement and
 medical expense.
 C. Implications for Compensatory Tort Awards
 This evidence from private and collective choices suggests that the tort
 norm of full coverage of all pecuniary loss plus pain and suffering far
 exceeds the coverage people are prepared to pay for given the choice.
 However, private choices may not be adequate evidence, to the extent
 that they are constrained by consumer misperceptions, moral hazard,
 adverse selection, and loading charges. If courts have superior access to
 information, lower costs of controlling adverse selection and moral
 hazard, or lower loading charges, optimal compensatory tort awards
 would exceed the revealed choices in private markets. Let us take each of
 these in turn.
 It is often argued that people tend to underestimate very low probability
 events, which would imply suboptimal insurance purchases. But to pur-
 chase appropriate first-party disability insurance, the individual does not
 need to know his risk from each possible source but only his overall
 probability of disability, which may be estimated from readily available
 21 Because insurance costs of disability act as an impediment to rehiring, all states have
 second injury funds for workers compensation, but many are very restricted in the scope of
 prior injuries covered. See Lloyd W. Larson & John F. Burton, Jr., Special Funds in
 Workers' Compensation (1981) (unpublished manuscript, Cornell Univ., School of Indus-
 trial and Labor Relations).
 22 U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 333 (1981).
 ADD does not cover disability due to illness, perhaps because illness entails more severe
 adverse selection and greater moral hazard of fraudulent claims than more readily identified
 injuries.
This content downloaded from 130.91.116.52 on Mon, 06 Jun 2016 18:25:41 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 TORT REFORM AND ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 525
 data. This overall probability of disability is not negligibly low. In 1978,
 10.9 million or 8.6 percent of the noninstitutionalized civilian population
 aged eighteen to sixty-four were severely disabled (unable to work al-
 together or unable to work regularly). A further 11.0 million (8.7 percent)
 reported partial disability (a health condition that restricts the kind or
 amount of work).23 Information costs are further reduced by employment-
 based group programs, which also reduce adverse selection.24 The fact
 that employee benefit programs are carefully coordinated with public pro-
 grams suggests that the apparent gaps in private coverage are due less to
 ignorance and adverse selection than to a desire by employees and insur-
 ers to constrain the moral hazard that would result from higher benefit
 levels. Moral hazard-which may take the form of reduced effort to pre-
 vent injury, exaggerated or fraudulent claims, or increased consumption
 of health services-obviously limits the coverage private markets can
 provide efficiently. Thus private contracts limit income replacement to
 60-70 percent of predisability earnings, reduce benefits by payments re-
 ceived from public programs to prevent more than full income replace-
 ment, impose upper limits on medical coverage, and exclude some ser-
 vices totally.
 The tort system seems to have no advantages over private insurance
 that would justify higher levels of compensation. Juries obviously have
 inferior information about individual preferences ex ante. As tort cover-
 age is compulsory, it is not subject to adverse selection, but neither are
 large private employment-based group plans.25 With respect to moral
 hazard, the tort system is more exposed than most private coverages. The
 potential for moral hazard arises because the claimant gains the full
 benefit of any award, net of his legal fees, whereas the cost is spread
 among all potential beneficiaries-consumers, in the case of product lia-
 bility, patients in the case of medical malpractice. To control moral
 23 U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 336 (1982-83),
 derived from U.S. Social Security Administration, 1978 Survey of Disability and Work:
 Databook (1982). A further 1.8 million persons under sixty-five (.9 percent of the under-
 sixty-five population) were in nursing homes. A 1974 survey showed 12 percent of severely
 disabled adults received veterans' benefits, so may have been disabled in military service.
 U.S. Department of Labor, An Interim Report to Congress on Occupational Disease 61
 (1980).
 24 For the effect of adverse selection on private insurance markets see Michael Rothschild
 & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Econom-
 ics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q. J. Econ. 629 (1976). The differential between the price of
 individual and group health coverage suggests severe adverse selection in the individual
 market.
 25 This feature of tort might be undermined if contracting out of tort rights were per-
 mitted, as suggested in Richard A. Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract,
 1976. Am. B. Found. Research J. 87.
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 hazard, private insurance contracts typically include a coinsurance per-
 centage that is higher the more the policyholder can do to affect the loss.
 Analogous protections in tort law are the contributory negligence defense
 (total bar to recovery) and the comparative negligence reduction in the
 award in proportion to the plaintiffs fault. But contributory negligence
 has been eliminated in many states in product liability cases, and com-
 parative negligence is of limited scope. Although legal fees constitute a
 sizable copayment for the plaintiff, their effect is muted by the contingent
 fee, which is paid only in the event of a positive recovery. In the absence
 of statutory limits on awards, there is no constraint comparable to the
 upper limit on coverage found in most private insurance contracts. The
 private insurance principle of less than full compensation to deter moral
 hazard is undermined by the collateral source rule, which denies evidence
 of coverage from other sources, and by disallowing evidence of the tax-
 free status of tort awards. Finally, with respect to administrative expense,
 the load on liability insurance policies, which is relevant to determining
 optimal tort awards, is higher than on first-party insurance.
 In conclusion, the tort system has no obvious advantage in terms of
 information, adverse selection, moral hazard, or administrative cost that
 would justify setting compensatory awards above the levels of insurance
 coverage chosen in employment-based group programs.
 D. Deterrent Surcharge
 The optimal value of the deterrent surcharge, over and above the com-
 pensatory award, depends on consumer willingness to pay for injury pre-
 vention, given optimal compensation, and on the degree to which this is
 internalized to injurers either through markets or through uninsured costs
 of suit.
 The best evidence for willingness to pay for injury prevention is labor
 market data on wage differentials in risky industries, because labor mar-
 kets reveal insurance and prevention trade-offs made subject to a large
 measure of cost internalization. Workers' compensation benefits reflect a
 legislated collective insurance choice in which employers and unions have
 significant input. Industry-specific collective bargaining provides a mech-
 anism for trading off wage levels, other benefits, and possibly safety
 measures. Thus, with the exception of SSDI and other public sources of
 compensation, labor markets reveal choices of injury prevention and in-
 surance when costs are internalized, insurance premiums are widely ex-
 perience rated,26 and potential victims, through unions, are reasonably
 well informed about injury risks.
 26 Richard B. Victor, Workers' Compensation and Workplace Safety: the Nature of Em-
 ployer Financial Incentives (Rand Corp. no. R-2979-ICJ, 1982).
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 Wage differentials in risky occupations imply a value of life ranging
 from $500,000 to over $4 million, and a value of $20-$30,000 for nonfatal
 injuries and illnesses (1980 prices).27 These labor market estimates obvi-
 ously cannot be immediately extrapolated to the willingness of potential
 tort claimants to pay for product or medical injury prevention. First, the
 theory indicates and the evidence confirms that willingness to pay de-
 pends on such factors as age, income, quality of life and risk in the
 absence of injury, voluntary versus involuntary assumption of risk, and
 the type of nonfatal injury or illness. Second, private choices are con-
 strained by private budgets. Most public insurance programs incorporate
 some income redistribution, and it is a normative issue whether the tort
 system should assess penalties and hence encourage differential preven-
 tion, by income level. Third, labor market choices do not internalize all
 social costs because the public programs, which pay a large share of the
 costs of disability, are not experience rated. Using a more complete
 theoretical model to incorporate all social costs, Arthur obtains estimates
 of the value of saving a life in different contexts that are under $1.4 million
 (1980 dollars) for all but the youngest age groups.28
 Even if consumer valuations of tort injuries could be accurately mea-
 sured, several factors argue against implementing them directly as fines.
 If the fine is insurable and does not affect the individual firm's premium,29
 then the fine serves no deterrent purpose. If paid to the victim, it provides
 excessive insurance. If refunded as a subsidy to consumers, the subsidy
 simply cancels the increment in price due to the cost of insurance, minus
 administrative costs. If the fine is not insurable, a fine of the magnitude
 implied by value of life estimates is likely to bankrupt most individual
 defendants. But as the prospective uninsured loss to the defendant in-
 creases, the need for a deterrent surcharge declines, since the optimal fine
 falls short of the victim's willingness to pay by the amount of any unin-
 sured cost to the defendant.
 E. Individual versus Scheduled Awards
 The tort system differs from the other major compulsory insurance
 systems-Social Security Disability (SSDI) and workers' compensa-
 27 W. Kip Viscusi, Risk by Choice: Regulating Health and Safety in the Workplace (1983).
 The $4 million is estimated at a risk of 6 x 10-4 (6/100,000) per year, and the mean annual
 risk of nonfatal injury was one in thirty. To see how wage premiums for risk are translated
 into implicit values for injury, consider the following example. If a worker receives $500 annu-
 ally in return for a one-in-thirty chance of injury, dividing $500 by '/3o yields an implicit value
 of $15,000 for an injury. This does not mean the worker would accept certain injury for $15,000.
 28 W. B. Arthur, The Economics of Risks to Life, 71 Am. Econ. Rev. 54 (1981). To adjust
 Arthur's calculations in 1975 dollars to 1980 dollars, I have multiplied by 1.4, the increase in
 the GNP price deflator.
 29 See note 36 infra.
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 tion-in determining compensation for each plaintiff individually and af-
 ter the occurrence of an injury. The only strategy available to defendants
 (or their insurers) to contain the resulting moral hazard on the part of
 claimants is legal defense effort. For medical malpractice and product
 liability, litigation expense by both parties equals the net compensation to
 plaintiffs.30 Overall, the defense and plaintiff contribute equally to this
 total, but the plaintiff spends more, relative to the defense, the larger the
 stakes.31
 If tort damage rules set optimal guidelines, but both sides invest in legal
 effort to maximize their private gain subject to these constraints, will the
 outcome be socially optimal?32 Ignoring any precedent and enforcement
 value of the case, the private benefit to the plaintiff of a higher award is
 the full social benefit, while the private cost to the defense reflects the
 social cost ultimately passed on to consumers, through liability insurance
 premiums and product prices. Thus the outcome should, on average,
 correspond to the social optimum, provided both parties face similar costs
 and payoffs to legal effort. We may assume both face a common price of
 legal effort. The evidence of a declining ratio of defense to plaintiff expen-
 diture then suggests that returns to legal effort decline more rapidly for
 the defense than for the plaintiff, the more severe the injury. This may
 reflect a propensity of juries to weigh benefits more heavily than costs
 when the beneficiaries are identified individuals but the costs are spread,
 consistent with the familiar tendency to value lives of known individuals
 more highly than unidentified statistical lives.
 This propensity is apparently exacerbated when the defendant is a cor-
 poration or an insurance company. For medical malpractice claims, I
 found an elasticity of awards with respect to the limits of the defendant's
 insurance coverage of .5-.9 for verdicts, .14 for out-of-court settle-
 ments.33 Peterson finds awards for similar injuries are higher for medical
 3o To the extent litigation expense provides information that contributes to the accurate
 enforcement of tort rules, it should not be viewed entirely as a deadweight cost of moral
 hazard.
 31 For malpractice claims closed 1975-78, the 64 percent of claims closed for less than
 $3,000 involved defense expenditure in excess of indemnity paid to plaintiffs. For cases paid
 over $100,000, defense expense averages less than 10 percent of indemnity. The limited
 evidence on plaintiff contingent fees shows no comparable decrease with size of stakes and
 an increase in fee percentage with stage of disposition.
 32 This is a special case of the issue whether common-law rules are efficient. See Paul H.
 Rubin, Common Law and Statute Law, 11 J. Legal Stud. 205 (1982), and citations therein.
 3 With an elasticity of .5, a $1,000 increase in insurance limits results in a $500 increase in
 award, holding constant other facts of the case. The estimate for court awards is based on a
 sample of only thirty-eight claims closed in 1970. The .9 estimate has a t-statistic of 3.19; the
 .55 estimate, which has a t-statistic of 1.88, includes defense expenditure as an explanatory
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 malpractice, product liability, and workplace injuries than for automobile
 injuries, where the defendant is typically an individual and carries lower
 limits of insurance coverage than most medical or product defendants.34
 The hypothesis that the judicial process tends to sanction moral hazard on
 the part of severely injured plaintiffs implies that awards for severe in-
 juries will exceed the socially optimal level, consistent with the theoret-
 ical and empirical analysis in the previous section.35
 Even if individualizing awards did not distort optimal compensation on
 average, it introduces variance that serves no useful purpose. Deterrence
 almost by definition depends on the expected penalty, so involves some
 element of averaging. If the mean were optimally set, variance would
 result in overdeterrence of risk-averse defendants. In practice, experi-
 ence rating of liability insurance premiums typically weights claim fre-
 quency more than severity, thereby muting the impact of variance in
 awards.36 From the standpoint of compensation, uncertainty reduces the
 value of an award as insurance to the plaintiff. Equivalently, the mean of a
 distribution of potential awards provides less utility than would a certain
 award equal to that mean.
 While individualized awards add little to the deterrence and compensa-
 tion value of the tort system, they do add to the litigation and insurance
 overhead costs. Like any unappropriated property right, the range of the
 potential award defines the maximum each party would spend on legal
 variable. The .14 estimate is based on a sample of 553 claims settled out of court. All three
 estimates control for number of defendants, severity of injury, age, and income of the
 plaintiff. Patricia Munch Danzon, The Disposition of Medical Malpractice Claims (R-2622
 HCFA, Rand Corp. 1980). Although the insurer can in principle contain this risk by the
 limits of coverage, some courts have overruled such contractual limits if the insurer declined
 a pretrial settlement offer.
 34 Mark A. Peterson, Compensation of Injuries: Jury Verdicts in Cook County (Rand
 Corp. 1983).
 35 The conventional wisdom is that the tort system tends to overcompensate minor in-
 juries and undercompensate severe injuries relative to economic loss. For out-of-court
 settlements, however, the conventional wisdom is consistent with a rising ratio of plaintiff-
 to-defense expense, since settlements tend to be lower (higher) the larger the litigation costs
 of the plaintiff (defense).
 36 This reflects in part the belief of liability insurers that the size of award, at some
 threshold, is beyond the control of the defendant, in part the purely statistical fact that since
 large awards are relatively infrequent, they have little statistical credibility. Reflecting this,
 both medical malpractice and product liability use a finer rating system for basic losses
 (claims below some threshold, $25,000 in 1980) than for excess losses. For example, basic
 Insurance Services Office (ISO) rates for medical malpractice reflect eight medical speciality
 classes and over fifty territories, but only two excess limits factors. To the extent merit
 rating of medical malpractice policies exists, it is independent of size of award. Patricia M.
 Danzon, Liability Insurance and the Tort System: The Case of Medical Malpractice (Work-
 ing Paper No. E-83-14, Hoover Inst. 1983). Small losses also receive more weight in work-
 ers' compensation experience rating. Victor, supra note 26.
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 effort to influence the outcome. Further, individualization adds to the
 variance and positive skewness of the distribution of awards and hence to
 the variance of insurance losses. In principle, this source of risk can be
 eliminated by pooling. In practice the number of policyholders in many
 states is too small to eliminate such risk.37
 F. The Collateral Source Rule
 The collateral source rule prohibits evidence to the jury of the plaintiff s
 compensation from other private and public programs. Elimination of the
 collateral source rule, to permit reduction of tort awards by the amount of
 collateral benefits, has been enacted in several states for medical malprac-
 tice cases and proposed for product liability.
 The main argument in favor of collateral source offset is to prevent
 double compensation: "The idea of a windfall runs counter to the basic
 end of tort law, which is to make the plaintiff whole, not to overcompen-
 sate him. . . . the aim should be to assure the plaintiff fair compensation
 from available sources, but no more."38
 But Posner has defended the traditional no-offset rule as necessary for
 optimal deterrence.39 Further, he argues that any double recovery is no
 windfall to the plaintiff since he paid for his first-party coverage and
 could, presumably, have opted for a cheaper policy that excluded cover-
 age of tort claims or assigned subrogation rights in such claims to his first-
 party insurer. One may add, at least in contexts where the victim and
 defendant are in a buyer/seller or employee/employer relation, that the
 victim has also indirectly paid for the compulsory insurance provided
 through the tort system, so is entitled to what he paid for.
 In a world with perfect information and costless contracting, the Coase
 theorem implies that the collateral source rule is neither necessary nor
 sufficient for optimal deterrence or optimal insurance. Consider the case
 of an injury that entails a purely monetary loss, fully covered by first-
 party insurance, and for which the tort rule of full compensation provides
 optimal insurance and deterrence. If the traditional collateral source rule
 of no offset applies, the tort award provides optimal deterrence, and a
 subrogation action by the first-party insurer against the insured (the plain-
 37 For example, year-to-year changes in the mean medical malpractice award exceed 100
 percent for half the states in the 1975-78 period and range from -90 percent to + 1,000
 percent. Thirty-five states had fewer than one hundred paid claims per year. Danzon, supra
 note 6.
 38 American Bar Association, Report to the Commission on Medical Professional Liabil-
 ity 147 (1977).
 39 Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (2d ed. 1977).
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 tiff in the tort suit) can eliminate double compensation.40 On the other
 hand, if the tort rule is full reduction of the award by the amount of
 collateral compensation, optimal compensation is achieved through the
 first-party insurance, and a subrogation action by the first-party insurer
 against the tortfeasor provides optimal deterrence. Thus, in either case,
 two actions are necessary but together are sufficient for optimal insurance
 and prevention. Alternatively, the subrogated insurer may simply receive
 part of the proceeds from any judgment or settlement.
 In practice, under the traditional rule of no offset, subrogation mitigates
 but does not fully eliminate double recovery because contracting out is
 not costless. The law recognizes subrogation rights of medical insurers
 against tortfeasors or their liability insurers,41 and the prevalence of sub-
 rogation clauses in medical policies indicates public preference to elimi-
 nate double coverage. But life and accident insurance has generally been
 denied subrogation rights, on the grounds that it provides "personal"
 insurance rather than "indemnity" insurance; that is, life and accident
 policies allegedly do not compensate for explicit economic losses. As
 Kimball and Davis point out, there are significant indemnity aspects in all
 forms of life and disability insurance. They conclude: "[W]here there is
 an insurance against a loss measurable in economic terms, the insurer
 should be legally subrogated quite as readily as in fire or collision insur-
 ance, once there has been full indemnification of the insured. Denial of
 legal subrogation should reflect the lack of adequate indemnification to
 the insured in the individual case, and nothing more.42
 But to allow subrogation only after full indemnification of the insured
 simply invites litigation over ill-defined rights, since indemnification for
 personal injury can never be complete. Unrestricted freedom to contract
 for subrogation in life and accident policies should be allowed, both to
 discourage the moral hazard created by double coverage and to permit
 individuals to choose their preferred level of compensation.
 Subrogation rights found in public programs are mixed. The Federal
 Medical Care Recovery Act grants the federal government a right to
 40 Optimal compensation might be achieved without the supplementary subrogation ac-
 tion if the first-party insurance simply excluded coverage of any injury with recovery against
 a third party. But such contracts tend to provide inferior insurance because of the uncer-
 tainty of tort recoveries and are less common than contracts providing subrogation rights.
 41 Spencer L. Kimball & Don A. Davis, The Extension of Insurance Subrogation, 60
 Mich. L. Rev. 841 (1962). Most first-party automobile medical coverages (which pay the
 policyholder's medical costs as an endorsement to his liability insurance policy) provide for
 subrogation against third parties.
 42 Id. at 859-60.
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 recover from a tortfeasor for medical expenses it incurs.43 Workers' com-
 pensation employers or their insurers have been explicitly accorded sub-
 rogation rights by statute in most states. However, SSDI does not have
 subrogation rights.
 Although the collateral source rule is irrelevant when subrogation is
 permitted and contracting costs are zero, the optimal rule in practice
 depends on the costs of contracting out of double compensation and of
 enforcing subrogation. One obvious guiding principle is that mandatory
 coverage should pay in full and be denied subrogation, whereas voluntary
 first-party coverages should be free to include enforceable subrogation
 clauses, thereby enabling individuals to contract out of double coverage
 or supplement the mandatory coverage if they desire. This principle ar-
 gues for retaining the traditional collateral source rule, since tort awards
 are a form of compulsory insurance, but granting all first party coverages
 subrogation rights.
 This rule allowing subrogation to voluntary coverages provides no guid-
 ance for coordinating tort with other mandatory coverages, in particular,
 SSDI. If tort awards were paid in periodic installments rather than a lump
 sum, then any future SSDI benefits could be reduced by the amount of the
 tort compensation for earnings loss, eliminating excess compensation
 while preserving deterrence.44 Providing for SSDI offset when tort awards
 are paid in a lump sum is less easy. Granting SSDI subrogation against the
 plaintiff at a later date may be unenforceable. If the SSDI offset must be
 made at the time of the tort judgment, the simplest solution is to reduce
 the tort award by the amount of the expected SSDI benefits, but this
 undermines deterrence. The alternative of granting SSDI subrogation
 rights against the tortfeasor yields superior deterrence and equivalent
 compensation, but with higher litigation expense. Such expense may be
 significant in the great majority of cases that settle out of court, typically
 for somewhat less than the potential verdict. The subrogation action must
 then determine whether the subrogated insurer should be entitled to full
 recovery or only to the proportion represented by the settlement relative
 to the potential verdict.45 Coordination of legal effort by the plaintiff and
 43 Rex Capwell & Thomas E. Greenwald, Legal and Practical Problems Arising from
 Subrogation Clauses in Health and Accident Policies, 54 Marq. L. Rev. 255, 281 (1971).
 4 Social Security Disability Income has similar offset provisions against state workers'
 compensation programs. Periodic payment of an amount fixed at the time of the judgment
 avoids the moral hazard of periodic payment of contingent expense discussed in Samuel A.
 Rea, Jr., Lump-Sum versus Periodic Damage Awards, 10 J. Legal Stud. 131 (1981). Optimal
 insurance would provide for disability payments for the duration of the victim's life, with
 some lesser payment to survivors in the event of early death, as in the California Medical
 Injury Compensation Reform Act, Code Civ. Proc., ? 667.7.
 45 The majority of courts use a prorata division, but some assign full compensation to the
 insured and some full compensation to the insurer. Robert E. Keaton, Insurance Law (1971).
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 subrogated insurer may also add costs. Thus efficient coordination of
 SSDI and tort benefits is an additional reason for periodic payment of tort
 awards.
 G. Conclusion
 This analysis indicates that the optimal structure of tort awards would
 be a schedule providing46
 compensation for medical expense such as that found in group major
 medical policies;
 compensation for wage loss up to 70 percent of predisability, pretax
 earnings (full replacement of after-tax earnings);
 no offset of private insurance coverage but unrestricted subrogation
 rights of private insurers against tortfeasors and their insurers;
 reduction of SSDI benefits by the amount of tort recovery for wage
 loss;
 a schedule of compensation for pain and suffering for serious injuries
 only; and,
 consistent with the principle of eliminating uncertainty, statutory stan-
 dards for determining inflation, interest rates, and wage growth parame-
 ters.
 In addition, an uninsurable fine may be appropriate in cases of severe
 injury, when (1) consumer underestimate of risk, fraud, or breach of
 explicit or implicit contract are at issue, or (2) defendants are fully in-
 sured. Where consumers are 9dequately informed or the defendant has
 incurred significant loss of time or reputation in defending the suit, deter-
 rence incentives may be adequate without a fine. The fine should be paid
 to the state and used to defray the public costs of the judicial system,
 thereby internalizing some of these costs to activities that cause injuries.
 Although this reduces the plaintiffs incentives to litigate, the effect may
 be negligible since a fine only applies in cases of severe injury where the
 compensatory award is large.
 Note that, to the extent the purpose of punitive damage awards is
 deterrence, this analysis of the optimal deterrent surcharge or fine applies
 directly: the optimal punitive award is simply the optimal fine.47
 6 This is not intended to preclude individual contracting for amounts different from the
 basic schedule, as advocated in Epstein, supra note 25.
 47 Obviously, if compensatory awards continue to compensate for pain and suffering, no
 fine is necessary. For an analysis of punitive damage awards, see Symposium on Punitive
 Damage Awards, Discussion, 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 155 (1982).
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 II. DURATION OF LIABILITY
 A. Risk Associated with Latent Injuries
 A common distinguishing feature of medical malpractice and product
 liability is the long duration of potential liability because of latent injuries
 and long-lived products. Regardless of the assignment of liability, delay
 between the triggering event and the manifestation of injury creates un-
 certainty in preventing and compensating for injuries. First, delay creates
 technological uncertainty in establishing the connection between the trig-
 gering event and the injury. Carcinogenic chemicals and drugs with long
 latent side effects are obvious examples. Second, delay introduces a
 financial risk in prefunding future compensation.48
 Tort law has increasingly extended liability to protect victims of latent
 injuries. For medical malpractice, many courts have adopted liberal dis-
 covery rules, which toll the running of the statute of limitations until the
 injury has been, or with reasonable diligence should have been, discov-
 ered. For product liability actions in tort, the statute does not begin to run
 until the occurrence or manifestation of the injury, which may be many
 years after the manufacture and initial sale of the product or exposure to
 the toxic substance. Since 1975, thirty-eight states have shortened their
 medical malpractice statutes of limitations or set an outer limit on the
 period allowed for discovery, but often with exceptions for minors and
 latent injuries. McGovern identifies ninety-eight statutes in forty-eight
 states that can be considered product liability statutes of repose.49
 In general, court rulings on the constitutionality of such statutes50 have
 not appreciated their effects on the efficiency of the tort system, some of
 which are addressed here. I ignore the fact that delay leads to decay of
 evidence, blurs the chain of causation, adds multiple defendants, and
 hence increases litigation expense. I focus instead on the effects of chang-
 ing and uncertain liability rules on deterrence, risk allocation, and regula-
 tory costs.
 First let us assume that standards are changing but known with cer-
 tainty. For example, there may be an upward trend in compensable dam-
 ages over time or a technological advance that reduces the cost of pre-
 venting injuries. The effect of such changes is that the optimal level of
 care becomes ambiguous. Prevention costs occur at time 1 but damages
 48 The financial risk arises because of uncertain timing, rather than delay per se. A certain
 time schedule of future payments can be matched with the maturity schedule of financial
 assets, thereby eliminating financial risk.
 49 McGovern, supra note 5.
 50 Note 3 supra.
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 occur at time 2. Under a negligence rule, an action that is not negligent by
 the standards of time 1 is negligent if costs or damages are valued at time
 2. Similarly, under a strict liability rule the optimal level of care becomes
 ambiguous.
 If future liability for latent injuries is fully internalized into the preven-
 tion and insurance decisions at time 1, consumers at time 1 pay for the
 higher safety and insurance standards of consumers at time 2. Provided
 the same individuals are involved throughout, this is no cause for con-
 cern. But with long latent injuries there are overlapping generations. The
 consumers who purchase the product or incur the exposure at time I are
 not the same as those who set liability rules at time 2, although obviously
 there is some overlap. Then with full internalization, long statutes force a
 transfer from the early to later generation.
 Alternatively, producers may choose not to prefund latent liability at
 time 1 but rather to face liability costs when they occur at time 2. But in a
 competitive industry with free entry these costs cannot be passed on to
 consumers at time 2. Established firms that try to pass on current costs
 arising out of past liability will be undercut by new entrants. So the cost of
 latent injuries will fall initially on producers and then on victims, in the
 event producers go bankrupt.
 The intergenerational transfer is a more serious issue when the injury
 itself is latent than it is in the case of a long-lived machine that may cause
 injuries over an extended period, but where the injury itself is im-
 mediately manifest. With the latent injury, the only transaction is between
 producers and consumers at time 1. If standards change, there is no way
 later generations can be made to pay for their tastes. With the long-lived
 machine, on the other hand, the rental or resale price in each period will
 reflect the expected costs of injuries in the period. If liability costs change
 due to rising standards of compensable damages, this can be reflected in
 prices to later generations of consumers. But if the increase in liability
 costs results from technological advance and a retroactively applied shift
 in the due-care standard, then in competitive markets the older, less safe
 machine will not be able to recoup its higher liability costs.5' This forced
 obsolescence is no different from obsolescence due to any change in
 technology or tastes, except that retroactively applied liability rules cur-
 tail a potentially longer economic life for those consumers willing to take
 51 In Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A2d 539 (1982), the
 New Jersey supreme court ruled that a manufacturer can be held liable for its failure to warn
 even if the hazard in question was unknowable at the time of the product's sale. See Gary T.
 Schwartz, New Product, Old Product, Evolving Law, Retroactive Law, 58 N.Y.U.L. Rev.
 796 (1983).
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 the higher risk in return for a lower price. But this is simply a special case
 of the general point that liability rules mandate uniform standards,
 thereby tending to deprive consumers of the freedom to choose riskier
 products or lower compensation. Thus one argument for a state-of-the-art
 defense for long-lived products is that it permits consumers more options.
 But if consumers are homogeneous in their preference for safety, courts
 that apply current standards of care retroactively are merely enforcing
 what informed markets would do otherwise.
 Now consider the more realistic case, where liability rules-the scope
 of liability, standard of care, rules of evidence, and size of damage
 awards-not only change but are unpredictable. Uncertainty about legal
 rules creates a risk additional to the unavoidable technological and
 financial risks intrinsic to latent injuries. This has two important implica-
 tions for liability insurance (see Appendix B). First, sociolegal risk
 creates parameter uncertainty by destroying the insurer's ability to pre-
 dict the loss distribution with any accuracy. Experience of the most re-
 cent policy years is not fully "mature," but the more mature experience
 of older policy years rapidly becomes obsolete in a nonstationary environ-
 ment.52 But even if statistical analysis could estimate past trends accu-
 rately, there is no guarantee the future will replicate the past.
 Second, a long statute of repose induces positive correlation among
 policyholders. The distribution of the expected loss per policyholder de-
 pends not only on the probability of an injury, but also (1) on the condi-
 tional probabilities, given an injury, that a claim is filed; (2) that an award
 is made; and (3) on the size of the award. These last three factors depend
 on the sociolegal climate common to all insureds. The longer the statute of
 repose, the greater the weight of sociolegal risk relative to individual risk,
 the greater the covariance among policyholders, and hence the greater the
 variance in the mean outcome for the insurance portfolio. At the limit,
 perfect correlation among outcomes for all policyholders is equivalent to
 insuring one single policyholder. Long statutes of repose in a volatile legal
 environment therefore reduce the financial gains from pooling, relative to
 self-insurance.
 52 The longer the statute of repose, the greater the backlog of claims that will be filed in
 response to a pro-plaintiff legal change, and the greater the amplitude of transitory cycles in
 frequency of claims filed per year. If the statute of repose is ten years, it requires ten years to
 determine whether an increase in the number of claims filed in the first year represents
 accelerated reporting of a given number of claims-in which case estimates of unreported
 claims should be decreased-or an increase in underlying frequency-in which case esti-
 mates of unreported claims should be increased.
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 B. Market Responses to Residual Risk
 First, a digression is necessary to describe the types of liability insur-
 ance contract, which determine the allocation of risk between the insurer
 and the policyholder. Traditionally, medical malpractice and product lia-
 bility insurance have been written on an occurrence basis. The typical
 medical malpractice occurrence policy written in policy year 1984 covers
 claims arising out of practice in 1984, no matter how far in the future the
 claims may be filed.53 A "claims made" policy covers claims filed in the
 policy year, arising out of prior practice; claims filed in subsequent years
 can be covered by a reporting endorsement, the availability but not the
 price of which is guaranteed when the basic policy is purchased. Thus, to
 have equivalent insurance with claims made, the policyholder must re-
 serve or self-insure for the reporting endorsement at the time he pur-
 chases the initial policy. The typical product occurrence policy covers
 injuries occurring in the policy year. Neither the time of manufacture of
 the product nor the time at which the claim is made is relevant. As in the
 case of claims made, since the insurer has more experience on which to
 base the premium, the policyholder is exposed to more pricing risk under
 this quasi-occurrence product policy than under the medical malpractice
 occurrence policy.54
 The medical malpractice occurrence coverage forces full prefunding,
 whereas the product occurrence policy and the claims made permit "pay
 as you go." To predict the appropriate premium for medical occurrence
 coverage, the insurer must predict claim frequency and severity for the
 duration of the discovery period or statute of repose, plus any lag in
 disposition beyond that, up to fifteen years. For claims made, the insurer
 must predict liability retrospectively for the discovery period. For the
 occurrence product policy, in the absence of a statute of repose, retro-
 spective prediction is indefinite and prospective prediction is for the stat-
 ute of limitations, which does not begin to run until the discovery of the
 injury.
 Residual risk for a given line of insurance, due to small risk pool,
 parameter uncertainty, or positive correlation among policyholders, is
 not necessarily fatal to diversification through market insurance. Di-
 3 Since a policy covers one year, policies written in 1984 cover incidents occurring
 January 1984-December 1985. Thus a policy year spans two calendar years.
 54 This applies particularly where all units of a product line are subject to similar risks.
 Some recent court rulings have interpreted product liability policies, like medical malprac-
 tice occurrence policies, to run from the injury-causing act of the insured rather than from
 the manifestation of the injury.
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 versification may occur within a multiline firm, writing different lines of
 insurance with negatively correlated experience, or through stock mar-
 kets. The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) implies that residual insurer
 risk is nondiversifiable only if it is systematic, that is, underwriting losses
 are highly correlated with losses for the market as a whole (high betas).
 But if underwriting losses are uncorrelated with the market, insurance
 premiums should reflect expected claim costs with little markup for risk.55
 There is some evidence that, contrary to these predictions of CAPM,
 the total variance of a firm's returns, including the nonsystematic compo-
 nent, is a significant determinant of the price of capital.56 In that case, or if
 betas are high, the competitive insurance premium would include a mark-
 up above expected costs. If the markup must be sufficient to reduce to a
 predetermined level the probability that claim costs exceed premiums,
 then the markup is proportional to the residual standard deviation of the
 mean, rc, which increases with the statute of limitations. The factor of
 proportionality increases with the desired safety margin. For example, if
 the desired probability of premium inadequacy should not exceed .01, the
 markup is 2.33rc for large risk pools, more for smaller groups. Evidence
 from medical malpractice rate hearings suggests that a standard deviation
 at least equal to the mean would be a conservative estimate. That would
 imply a "very safe" premium rate three times the expected claim costs,
 plus overhead. I do not wish to imply that risk premiums of this mag-
 nitude are built into malpractice or product liability rates.57 I do contend
 that, with a long duration of liability, a substantial markup for risk may be
 warranted, even in competitive insurance markets.
 If premiums include a markup for nondiversifiable risk, the expectation
 is that ex post there will be net transfer from policyholders to equity
 owners. This raises the price of market insurance relative to self-
 5 The CAPM implies a competitive insurance premium, P = [E(c) - Xrmc]I/( + Rf),
 where E(c) is expected costs, X is the market risk premium, rr,,c is the covariance between
 the market return and claims, and Rf is the risk-free rate of return. Underwriting betas, by
 line, cannot be estimated by standard methods, even for stock insurers, because the typical
 firm's overall beta compounds returns on multiple lines of insurance, investment and nonin-
 surance operations. Raymond D. Hill, Profit Regulation in Property-Liability Insurance, 10
 Bell J. Econ. 172 (1979); William B. Fairley, Investment Income and Profit Margins in
 Property-Liability Insurance: Theory and Empirical Results, 10 Bell J. Econ. 192 (1979);
 Patricia Munch & Dennis E. Smallwood, Theory of Solvency Regulation in the Property and
 Casualty Insurance Industry, in Studies in Public Regulation (Gary Fromm ed. 1981).
 56 Haim Levy, The CAPM and Beta in an Imperfect Market, 6 J. Portfolio Management 5
 (1980).
 57 The formula used by the ISO to calculate advisory rates incorporates only a 5 percent
 markup over losses plus expenses, for profit and other contingencies. But other components
 of the formula-in particular, projected losses-are sufficiently judgmental to accommodate
 an implicit allowance for risk.
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 insurance and increases incentives for risk retention. There is consider-
 able evidence to support this hypothesis. In medical malpractice, in re-
 sponse to the large premium increases in 1975, physician-owned mutuals
 were formed and have expanded to cover over 40 percent of the market in
 1982. A substantial fraction of hospital insurance is written through cap-
 tive companies. The leading commercial carrier and several smaller car-
 riers have replaced the traditional occurrence policy with a claims-made
 policy, which transfers from the insurer to the insured the risk associated
 with reserving for late claims.58
 For product liability, measuring the market shares of self-insurance and
 commercial insurance is impossible, because product liability is typically
 written as part of a comprehensive general liability policy and, more
 fundamentally, because the market itself-those potentially exposed to
 product liability-is ill defined. But risk retention is obviously significant.
 Trade association surveys, admittedly nonrandom samples, show up to 30
 percent of firms without insurance, increased deductibles over time, and
 lower limits of coverage relative to expected losses.59 Large firms often
 purchase retrospectively rated policies and many have formed captive
 insurers or self-insure, despite the tax advantages of commercial insur-
 ance.60 Smaller firms, for whom the risks and fixed capital costs of self-
 insurance or captive insurance are relatively high, have obtained special
 legislation to form risk pools.61
 C. Implications of Long Statutes of Repose for the Tort System
 The statute of repose defines the duration of liability shifting. The test
 for an efficient statute involves weighing, at the margin, any efficiency
 gains and losses in risk allocation, deterrence, and overhead costs. Obvi-
 58 Since insurers presumably face lower costs of estimating and reserving for future
 liability than do individual policyholders, one attraction of claims made apparently is its pay-
 as-you-go feature: there is no requirement to predict and prefund future liability. This is less
 costly to policyholders in industries with significant barriers to entry and where insurance
 premiums are not individually rated, which may explain why claims made has been adopted
 in medical malpractice but not product liability.
 5 U.S. Department of Commerce, Interagency Task Force on Product Liability, Final
 Report (1978). Over 30 percent of firms in the machine tool industry either were not insured
 or carried a deductible averaging $80,000. Problems Associated with Product Liability:
 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Finance of the House Comm.
 on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., Ist Sess., June 26, September 27, and
 October 16, 1979, at 35.
 60 Self-insurance reserves are not tax deductible until paid out as claims. Premiums paid
 to a captive insurer are tax deductible only if there is a transfer of risk, the operational
 definition of which is currently under litigation. Business Insurance, August 1, 1983.
 61 Product Liability Risk Retention Act of 1981, 15 U.S.C. ? 3901.
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 ously there is no unique optimal statute for all contexts. My purpose here
 is to point out how the gains from attempting full internalization through a
 long statute fall as time elapses from the triggering event.
 Consider first risk spreading, which has been one of the primary
 justifications for extending the liability of producers.62 The argument
 tends to ignore risk spreading through first-party insurance; it presup-
 poses that the producer is fully insured and can pass on the cost of this
 insurance in the product price, such that consumers pay for their own
 insurance. In this ideal situation there is no burden on producers and no
 transfer between generations of consumers. The evidence above suggests
 that such costless, distribution-neutral insurance is not feasible for latent
 injuries subject to sociolegal risk. If future injury costs are fully pre-
 funded, either through an occurrence policy written at the time of the
 triggering event, or through a quasi-occurrence or claims-made policy
 where the producer prefunds the expected cost of a reporting endorse-
 ment, the early generation of consumers pays for the expected standards
 of liability and damages adopted by later generations and for uncertainty
 as to those standards. If this future liability is not prefunded, the intergen-
 erational transfer is avoided. But to the extent current insurance costs to
 cover prior liability cannot be passed on, these costs fall on producers or
 injured victims. Thus the allocation of risk achieved by long statutes of
 repose is not necessarily preferable to that achieved with a short statute,
 given the availability of first-party private and public insurance.
 With respect to deterrence, if the time path of liability rules entails an
 anticipated expansion of compensable damages or retroactive application
 of new knowledge, then the legal changes force a transfer from early to
 later generations. Such a transfer cannot be judged inefficient but may be
 considered undesirable, if wealth is rising over time. Where liability is not
 only expanding but also uncertain, such that insurance premiums include
 a markup for nondiversifiable risk, this markup is equivalent to a tax on
 activities with potential latent injuries and long-lived capital goods, if
 producers insure or self-insure. But if the response to high insurance costs
 is to go bare, such that the expected cost of injuries is limited to assets
 that can be attached in bankruptcy proceedings, the prevention incentives
 that remain may be suboptimal. The incentive to go bare and risk or even
 plan bankruptcy is greater the less the specific or brand-name capital at
 62 For example, Justice Traynor's concurring decision in Esola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,
 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944), "The cost of an injury . . . may be an overwhelming
 misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury can be insured by
 the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business." See also
 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897
 (1963).
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 stake.63 Consistent with this prediction, small firms, which arguably have
 less brand-name capital than large firms, are more likely to go without
 product liability insurance,64 and very few physicians go bare. In general,
 if there is sufficient uncertainty about liability rules to generate significant
 nondiversifiable insurance risk, the value of such liability as a guide to
 prevention is questionable.65
 In addition to the direct impact on prevention and risk allocation, the
 uncertainty created by long statutes of repose has generated other indirect
 costs. In malpractice, disagreement over the appropriate price of insur-
 ance has led to regulation of insurance premiums to levels deemed inade-
 quate by commercial companies and to their total withdrawal from sev-
 eral states.66 By contrast, product liability, which so far is not subject to
 rate regulation, experienced premium increases at least as great as those
 proposed for medical malpractice but no comparable lack of availability.
 The Interagency Task Force on Product Liability cited judgmental insur-
 ance rate making as a major cause of the product liability problem. Its
 proposed solutions include more comprehensive data collection and
 regulatory monitoring of rates to ensure that they are "fair, non-
 discriminatory and reasonably related to product risk." The analysis here
 suggests that even if the full universe of potential data is available, rate
 making will optimally involve an element of judgment commensurate to
 the relative importance of sociolegal risk.67 Where such risk is large,
 uncertainty about fair rates cannot be resolved statistically. Regulation of
 rates to the lower end of the feasible range is likely to induce carrier
 withdrawal and lack of availability as occurred in medical malpractice.68
 63 Munch & Smallwood, supra note 55.
 64 The greater propensity of small firms to go bare may also reflect a relatively higher
 price of insurance.
 65 See James A. Henderson, Jr., Coping with the Time Dimension in Products Liability,
 69 Cal. L. Rev. 919 (1981). The bankruptcy filings of three major corporations and implied
 inadequacy of funds, through either insurance or self-insurance sources, to pay asbestos
 claims is apparent evidence that in this context imposing liability does not deter, either
 because the injuries were unforeseeable, the liability was unforeseeable, or the bankruptcy
 option was cheaper. The net result is an excessively costly form of insurance.
 6 Patricia Danzon, The Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis Revisited: Causes and
 Solutions (Working Paper E-83-11, Hoover Inst., July 1983).
 67 With pooled information and rate making in concert, errors in parameter forecasts will
 be correlated and insurer insolvencies will tend to occur together. Emilio Venezian, Insurer
 Capital Needs under Parameter Uncertainty, 50 J. Risk & Insurance 19 (1983).
 68 To ensure availability, most states established a joint underwriting authority (JUA)
 which requires commercial insurers to write medical malpractice as a condition of writing
 other lines of insurance in the state. Typically, JUA losses may be recouped by a tax write-
 off or a surcharge on premiums in other lines of insurance. While some subsidy may in
 principle be justified to offset the risk tax implicit in insurance premiums, this is an
 inefficient method of effecting such a subsidy.
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 D. Conclusion
 I have argued that unlimited producer liability for latent injuries and
 long-lived products tends to create costs of inefficient risk allocation,
 overdeterrence, and regulatory conflict that may outweigh any benefits
 from attempting full cost internalization. If producer liability is to be
 curtailed, one option is simply to apply a short statute of repose, running
 from the occurrence of the injurious act (or date of first sale in the case of
 capital goods) rather than from the manifestation of injury. The statute
 should be shorter the more volatile are sociolegal rules. Injuries discov-
 ered after the running of the statute would be borne by the victim's first-
 party insurance or public programs. Since these are pay-as-you-go
 programs covering all injuries regardless of cause, the issue of
 nondiversifiable risk does not arise. The presumption of some judicial
 rulings that manufacturers are better able than consumers to spread risk is
 at best of doubtful validity, but almost certainly false when sociolegal risk
 is at issue. Let us allow that risk misperception and adverse selection lead
 to suboptimal private insurance for those not eligible for employment-
 based group programs. That this problem applies to all injuries, not just to
 the small fraction potentially eligible for tort compensation, argues for a
 general public program such as SSDI rather than for extending the com-
 pulsory insurance through tort to cover at most a small fraction of cata-
 strophic injuries. It is ironic and unfortunate that current rules of eligibil-
 ity for SSDI are based on recent employment and exclude precisely those
 for whom private insurance markets function relatively poorly.
 An alternative solution to the latent injury problem is to shift liability to
 the government. In some states, compensation funds already pay
 malpractice awards beyond a statutory threshold-typically $100,000 per
 defendant. Proposals for special government funds for occupational dis-
 ease are proliferating; but, again, they perversely single out the employed
 who, among all victims of toxic exposure, are most likely to have alterna-
 tive private or workers' compensation coverage. The main advantage of
 government intervention is to prevent the forced prefunding of future
 liability, the resulting transfer from early to later generations, and the risk
 tax on the early generation (ignoring planned bankruptcy). But this pur-
 pose is served by simply curtailing liability through a statute of repose.
 The disadvantages of government funds are obvious. With respect to
 deterrence, government funds tend to protect producers from efficient as
 well as inefficient impositions of liability. With respect to compensation,
 theory and evidence from other government programs suggest that when
 benefit levels and eligibility criteria are set through the political process
 for a specific, identifiable group of beneficiaries, the moral hazard-or
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 tendency to award excessive levels of insurance-may be greater than
 through the tort system.
 A full analysis of the occupational disease problem is beyond the scope
 of this paper. The analysis here provides an additional reason to exting-
 uish tort remedies against product suppliers or employers. To encompass
 diseases, such as cancer, that have at least a twenty-year latency period
 would require a statute of repose at least that long. The risk costs of such
 a statute probably outweigh any benefits, given the volatility of tort stan-
 dards. This logic applies to a lesser degree to workers' compensation
 liability, because compensation benefits and eligibility criteria are set by
 statute and can therefore be more readily constrained. Of course the
 problems of prolonged liability are avoided if liability is imposed on the
 employer at the time the injury is manifest. But this eliminates all deter-
 rence and exposes victims to risk. Because prior liability costs cannot be
 passed on in current product prices, the person with prior toxic exposure
 may face difficulties in obtaining new employment, unless costs are
 shifted to second injury funds. A superior solution for deterrence and risk
 allocation may be to prorate liability over all employers contributing to
 the exposure; to limit benefits to levels prevailing at the time of exposure,
 adjusted upward by the rate of return on reserves between exposure and
 manifestation; and to rely on second injury funds or first-party insurance
 and SSDI in the event none of the responsible employers are available.
 APPENDIX A
 OPTIMAL DAMAGE AWARDS
 The model applies in any market context where consumers may be injured by
 product failure that depends only on the care taken by producers. Assume that
 expenditure on prevention affects the probability but not the size of loss and that
 each consumer buys just one unit of the product.69 Insurance for first-party or
 liability losses is available, with perfect experience rating and a proportionate
 loading charge. The following notation is used:
 V(B) = consumer's utility of initial wealth, V' > 0, V" < 0;
 p(r) = probability of injury, p' < 0, p" > 0;
 r = quality (prevention) per unit;
 s = product price;
 c(r) = production cost per unit, c' > 0, c" < 0;
 L = monetary loss to consumer if injury occurs;
 M = first-party insurance coverage bought by consumer;
 69 This abstracts from the effects of liability rules on the level of activity. See Steven
 Shavell, Strict Liability versus Negligence, 9 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1980).
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 yp = premium rate per dollar of first party coverage, where y - 1 is the loading charge;
 h(p) = consumer's perception of p, h' > 0, h" < 0;
 U(A) = producer's utility of initial wealth, U' > 0, U" < 0;
 D = damages paid by producer if found liable;
 Q = liability insurance coverage bought by producer;
 Xp = premium rate per dollar of liability coverage, where X - 1 is the
 loading charge;
 1i = Lagrange multiplier.
 Subscript 0 denotes the state in which an injury occurs. Subscript 1 denotes the
 state in which no injury occurs. Subscriptsf, s, and n denote first-party, strict, and
 negligence liability, respectively. Initially, consumers are assumed to be fully
 informed.
 FIRST-PARTY LIABILITY
 If consumers are fully informed, competitive markets induce producers to
 choose the level of safety (r) and product price (s) to maximize expected utility of
 consumers, E(V), subject to maintaining an opportunity level of utility, UC, deter-
 mined by the producer's alternative use of time.7" Consumers select first-party
 insurance coverage (M), given the price per dollar of coverage, p. Informed
 markets thus solve the following optimization problem:
 max b = (1 -p)VI[B - s - ypM] + p Vo[B - s - ypM - L + M]
M, ,r (Al)
 + iI {U[A + s - c(r)] - Uc}.
 Maximization with respect to M, s, and r yields
 y V' = V0, (A2)
 V' = I U', (A3)
 c' -p' -V' + y M, (A4)
 where V' = (1 - p) V1 + p V0.
 Rewriting equation (2),
 V'1 _ 1 - p < 1 as y- 1, (A2')
 shows that optimal coverage does not fully equate the marginal utility of income if
 the insurance premium contains a proportionate load (y > 1). Equation (A4)
 shows that if injury reduces the utility of income (V1 > V0), optimal prevention
 (rf) may exceed the optimal level with risk neutrality (c' = - p'L), even with full
 insurance coverage of any monetary loss.
 70 If the producer has monopoly power, Uc includes some rent, but the structure of the
 problem is not affected.
This content downloaded from 130.91.116.52 on Mon, 06 Jun 2016 18:25:41 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 TORT REFORM AND ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 545
 STRICT THIRD-PARTY LIABILITY
 Under a rule of strict third-party liability, an omniscient benevolent dictator
 would choose the damage award (D), defendant's liability insurance coverage
 (Q), prevention (r), and product price (s) to maximize the consumer's expected
 utility, subject to maintaining the producer's opportunity level of utility, Uc:
 max ( = (1 -p)V1[B - s] + pVo[B - s - L + D]
 D,Q,s,r
 + 4 {(1 - p)U1 [A + S - c(r) - XpQ] (A5)
 + pUo[A + s - c(r) - XpQ - (D - Q)] - Uc}.
 Maximization with respect to D, Q, s, and r yields:
 V6 = U , (A6)
 XU' = U (A7)
 V' = U' (A8)
 c , P( V, - V' + U,- Uo + XQ), (A9)
 where U' = (1 - p) U{ + pU6.
 Equations (A6), (A7), and (A8) together imply:
 V - U; _ l-Xp 1 as 1.
 vo u6 x--Xp
 The optimal damage award, D*, provides the level of insurance consumers
 would choose to buy given the load of the producer's liability insurance. Thus
 D* M, as X y.
 NEGLIGENCE
 Under a negligence rule, the producer is liable only if he fails to meet the due-
 care standard, r *. The social welfare function is given by equation (Al) for r < r*
 and by equation (A5) for r > r* . If U is state dependent, the producer cannot fully
 insure against the loss. The social welfare function is discontinuous, with a verti-
 cal jump at r* because of the loss imposed on producers.71 If D is set at D *, the
 optimal level of insurance given the liability load, and r* = r , the producer's
 decision problem is to choose Q, s, and r to maximize E(V), subject to E(U) > UC
 and subject to the penalty D = D* if r < r*. But this private objective function is
 identical to the social welfare function; that is, it is a discontinuous function equal
 to equation (A 1) for r > r and equal to equation (A5) for r < r*. If either X > y- or
 7' Note that this discontinuity occurs in the social (and private) welfare function for
 reasons related but not identical to those noted in Robert D. Cooter, Economic Analysis of
 Punitive Damages, 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 79 (1982). Here markets force producers to internalize
 injuries to victims, so these costs are not avoided by being nonnegligent. However, the
 defendant's personal costs of suit are avoided.
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 Uo < U1, this negligence rule will lead producers to choose r = r*, that is, to be
 nonnegligent.72
 Imperfect Information. If consumers underestimate risks, under first-party
 liability they buy too little insurance and nonoptimal safety. Spence shows that
 under strict liability, a first-best solution with respect to compensation and pre-
 vention can be achieved by means of a two-part penalty." A compensatory award
 equal to D* is paid to victims. A fine, paid to the state initially but refunded as a
 subsidy to the hazardous product, is set equal to (1 - h') (V1 - Vo)/V', where
 h(p) is the consumer's perception of p and (V1 - Vo)/V' is the dollar measure of
 utility loss implied by the consumer's willingness to pay for injury reduction.
 Under a negligence rule with a risk-averse defendant and incomplete insurance,
 provided the standard of care is correctly set at rf, the fine necessary to achieve
 compliance is less than under strict liability because of the discontinuity of the
 pay-off function. The physician will choose to meet the standard, provided
 UI - VI - Vo h' M. U' V' pI)
 Thus if the load on liability insurance is at least as great as the load on first-party
 insurance (h > y), a fine over and above the compensatory award paid to victims
 is not necessary to induce compliance with a negligence standard, if the uncom-
 pensated cost of suit to defendants (Ul - Uo)/U' exceeds the distortion in market
 incentives due to consumer misperceptions [(V1 - V0)/V'][1 - (h'/p')]. Since the
 fine-subsidy mechanism is presumably costly to administer, this likelihood that
 incentives are adequate without a fine is an added attraction of a negligence rule
 over strict liability.
 APPENDIX B
 EFFECTS OF LONG STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS ON INSURANCE RISK
 STANDARD MODEL OF "RISK-FREE" INSURANCE
 For each of n policyholders, the expected claims cost, E(Ci), is an independent
 drawing from a loss distribution with known mean 1i and standard deviation r. By
 the central limit theorem (CLT), regardless of the shape of the underlying loss
 distribution, the cost of the total insurance portfolio is normally distributed with
 mean n i and variance no"2. The relative risk of the insurance portfolio, defined as
 72 If X > - > 1, it might be optimal to provide compensation through first-party coverage
 and impose a liability fine on physicians to achieve optimal deterrence. Enforcement would
 depend on subrogation actions by the patient's first-party insurer against the tortfeasor or his
 liability insurer.
 73 Spence, supra note 4.
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 the coefficient of variation, is or/Vi.74 As n approaches infinity, the limiting
 distribution of the random variable Z, defined as
 Z = >Ci- n-
 Vicr
 approaches a standard normal distribution. Since
 n
 pr(ZCiEn1 + ZrVno = r) , (B 1)
 where Zr is a standard normal ordinate for confidence level r, if the firm estab-
 lishes a capital reserve of Zr, /na, the probability of insolvency is 1 - r. For
 example, if the desired probability of insolvency is .01, Zr = 2.33.
 Assume that all capital must be raised from policyholders, as in a mutual. A
 premium rate, R, set equal to the expected claims cost per policyholder, [L, plus a
 markup of 2.33 a/Vn, will cover losses with .99 probability. As n tends to infinity,
 the standard deviation of the mean loss per policyholder, r/V/, and hence the
 capital contribution necessary to assure the desired probability of solvency, tends
 to zero.75
 UNKNOWN PARAMETERS: STATIONARY DISTRIBUTION
 When the parameters of the underlying loss distribution are not known with
 certainty, using estimates Me and Se in place of I. and a in equation (B 1) will result
 in a less than .99 probability of solvency.76 If the underlying loss distribution is
 stationary, the parameters can be estimated from past experience, but the
 confidence interval formula must include an adjustment for sampling variation in
 the parameter estimates. Assuming independence from year to year and an equal
 number of policyholders in the estimation period (ne) and the future policy year
 (nf), the required rate is
 R = Me + Zro ( 1 + 1 = Me + ZrV2hcI. Sne nf
 Since 2- = 1.41, adjustment for sampling error in the mean increases the safety
 mark-up by 41 percent, but the total still tends to zero as n tends to infinity.77
 74 J. David Cummins, Insurer's Risk: A Restatement, 41 J. Risk & Insurance 147 (1974).
 75 If n is insufficient to justify using the limiting normal distribution, then Chebyshev's
 inequality can be used. This states that if X,, is the mean of a random sample of size n from a
 distribution with mean pL and variance a2, then pr[XY,, - >l k//n]7 < 1/k2 = r, where k =
 r/n-a. Thus if r = .01, the required capital contribution is ten standard deviations, instead
 of 2.33 under normality. For use of the normal power approximation, see Venezian, supra
 note 67.
 76 Gary M. Andrews, A Note on the Use of Statistics in Rate Determination, 35 J. Risk &
 Insurance 320 (1968).
 77 Adjustment for unknown a when losses are normally distributed is discussed in Cum-
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 NONSTATIONARY DISTRIBUTION
 1. Sociolegal Risk
 For the ith policyholder, claims cost for a given policy year J is the sum of
 claims filed in each development year t until the statute of limitations has run, T:
 Cij = cT=j ci,. (Discounting and delay in settlement are ignored and policy year
 subscripts are dropped hereafter except where necessary.) Assume that cit is
 drawn from a distribution with mean ,t and variance cr0t. The total variance, cr,,
 has two components: a policy year component, ur, reflecting policyholder charac-
 teristics, and a development year component, tr,,, reflecting legal factors. Thus
 expected loss for the ith policyholder is
 T
 E(Ci)= E[ (it+ wit) + uil t=j
 Y, ? it- t=j
 Expected loss on the insurance portfolio of n policies is E (17 Ci) = nQ i with
 variance:
 N T
 var C) = nc + >[nut, + n(n - 1)pwi, (B2)
 j=1t=j
 where pwowt is the covariation among policyholders in the tth development year.
 The standard deviation of loss per policyholder is
 re = S(C) = Iyrln + >[O twtIn + Pwr2wt - pwtln], (B3) t=j
 with limiting value for large n and common cwt, for all t:78
 lim O'e, = r wt = V t=j
 Thus the sociolegal risk due to development year shocks which affect all policy-
 holders is a multiplicative function of the magnitude of the shock (cw), the number
 of development years (T), and the correlation among policyholders (pw). It is
 independent of the size of the risk pool, n.
 mins, supra note 74. For personal injury lines where the normality assumption is clearly
 inappropriate, more complex methods are needed.
 78 Sociolegal risk is more or less than proportional to the statute of limitations, as aw, Z
 rwt-1, that is, development-year shocks increase or decrease with years after the policy
 year. Although number of claims filed is likely to decrease with time, size of loss is likely to
 increase, both because of inflation of awards and because the added cost due to decay of
 evidence over time eliminates relatively more minor claims.
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 2. Parameter Uncertainty
 To predict the mean pj for policy year j, a common procedure is (1) to "de-
 velop" the immature experience of recent policy years, extrapolating from report-
 ing patterns on prior years; (2) to fit a trend, g, through K developed previous
 policy years; and (3) to apply this trend to the most recent policy year (or a
 weighted average of the two or three most recent). Thus, j = Cj_ i. The actual
 value is Cj = gpj-_ + vj + ej, where v is a stochastic component in the trend, with E(v) = 0, E(v2) = Or and E (vj, vj-) = 0; and ej = uj + wj has mean zero and
 standard deviation re given by equation (B3).
 The prediction base, Cj_ I, is measured with error, Cj_ - p-j 1 = ej + sj, where
 ej = uj + wi, and sj is development error due to estimating ultimate experience on
 the basis of reporting patterns against earlier years. Assume that this development
 error has zero mean and is not correlated serially or with other error components:
 E(s) = 0, E(sj, s_ ) = 0, E(s, v) = 0. The discrepancy between predicted and actual value is d = j - Cj = (9 - g)Cj_ I + g(Cj_- - Lj-1) - v - e, with E(d) =
 0, and
 var (d) = o2 [1 + Cjl' (X'X)-'Cj1] + (g + 1) r2e + gcr
 -V + "2 + g (.24 + "2)+ e2
 The prediction variance thus has four components. ov is due to unexplained
 residual variance in the model predicting the trend. or2 is due to error in estimating
 the trend, g. The third term, g(re + ors) reflects measurement error in the base
 used for extrapolation, Cj_ 1. And e2 is the policy year residual.
 Thus assuming normality, the premium rate required for a (1 - r) probability of
 insolvency is R = +. + Zr Vc + + gcr2 + (g + 1) re, which has limiting
 value, as n -* oo, R = r. + Zr~V/ + + gor + (g + 1) Tpwrw. Long statutes
 of limitations contribute to nondiversifiable insurer risk through projection error
 (or and or2) and by increasing the weight attached to sociolegal changes correlated
 across insureds (/wYaw).
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